ECOMIMIC APPROACHES TO THE ISSUES OF COLLECTIVE PROPERTY OF RESOURCES (EXAMPLE: FOREST PROPERTY)
The article deals with the proposed by American economist and Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom mechanism of management of objects of common use: the alternative to privatization and nationalization. This option is based on the spontaneous order of self-organization and decentralization of management, as well as the rejection of attempts to develop a general national strategy for managing these resources. This approach poses new challenges to the economy of the forest sector in Russia in shaping the strategy of economic development of forestry.
Keywords: tragedy of the commons, common resources, privatization, self-organization, spontaneous order, decentralization, economics of forestry, the management of collective property
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Issue: 12, 2013
Series of issue: Issue 12
Rubric: REGIONAL ECONOMY
Pages: 52 — 56
Downloads: 965